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ABSTRACT
Consumers’ purchase decisions are increasingly influenced
by user-generated online reviews [3]. Accordingly, there has
been growing concern about the potential for posting decep-
tive opinion spam—fictitious reviews that have been deliber-
ately written to sound authentic, to deceive the reader [15].
But while this practice has received considerable public at-
tention and concern, relatively little is known about the ac-
tual prevalence, or rate, of deception in online review com-
munities, and less still about the factors that influence it.
We propose a generative model of deception which, in con-
junction with a deception classifier [15], we use to explore the
prevalence of deception in six popular online review commu-
nities: Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline, TripAdvisor,
and Yelp. We additionally propose a theoretical model of
online reviews based on economic signaling theory [18], in
which consumer reviews diminish the inherent information
asymmetry between consumers and producers, by acting as a
signal to a product’s true, unknown quality. We find that de-
ceptive opinion spam is a growing problem overall, but with
different growth rates across communities. These rates, we
argue, are driven by the different signaling costs associated
with deception for each review community, e.g., posting re-
quirements. When measures are taken to increase signaling
cost, e.g., filtering reviews written by first-time reviewers,
deception prevalence is effectively reduced.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consumers rely increasingly on user-generated online re-
views to make, or reverse, purchase decisions [3]. Accord-
ingly, there appears to be widespread and growing concern
among both businesses and the public [12, 14, 16, 19, 20,
21] regarding the potential for posting deceptive opinion
spam—fictitious reviews that have been deliberately writ-
ten to sound authentic, to deceive the reader [15]. Perhaps
surprisingly, however, relatively little is known about the ac-
tual prevalence, or rate, of deception in online review com-
munities, and less still is known about the factors that can
influence it. On the one hand, the relative ease of producing
reviews, combined with the pressure for businesses, prod-
ucts, and services to be perceived in a positive light, might
lead one to expect that a preponderance of online reviews
are fake. One can argue, on the other hand, that a low rate
of deception is required for review sites to serve any value.1
The focus of spam research in the context of online reviews
has been primarily on detection. Jindal and Liu [8], for
example, train models using features based on the review
text, reviewer, and product to identify duplicate opinions.2
Yoo and Gretzel [23] gather 40 truthful and 42 deceptive
hotel reviews and, using a standard statistical test, manually
compare the psychologically relevant linguistic differences
between them. While useful, these approaches do not focus
on the prevalence of deception in online reviews.
Indeed, empirical, scholarly studies of the prevalence of
deceptive opinion spam have remained elusive. One reason
is the difficulty in obtaining reliable gold-standard annota-
tions for reviews, i.e., trusted labels that tag each review
as either truthful (real) or deceptive (fake). One option for
producing gold-standard labels, for example, would be to
rely on the judgements of human annotators. Recent stud-
ies, however, show that deceptive opinion spam is not eas-
ily identified by human readers [15]; this is especially the
case when considering the overtrusting nature of most hu-
man judges, a phenomenon referred to in the psychological
1It is worth pointing out that a review site containing de-
ceptive reviews might still serve value, for example, if there
remains enough truthful content to produce reasonable ag-
gregate comparisons between offerings.
2Duplicate (or near-duplicate) opinions are opinions that
appear more than once in the corpus with the same (or sim-
ilar) text. However, simply because a review is duplicated
does not make it deceptive. Furthermore, it seems unlikely
that either duplication or plagiarism characterizes the ma-
jority of fake reviews. Moreover, such reviews are potentially
detectable via off-the-shelf plagiarism detection software.
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deception literature as a truth bias [22]. To help illustrate
the non-trivial nature of identifying deceptive content, given
below are two positive reviews of the Hilton Chicago Hotel,
one of which is truthful, and the other of which is deceptive
opinion spam:
1. “My husband and I stayed in the Hilton Chicago and
had a very nice stay! The rooms were large and com-
fortable. The view of Lake Michigan from our room
was gorgeous. Room service was really good and quick,
eating in the room looking at that view, awesome! The
pool was really nice but we didnt get a chance to use it.
Great location for all of the downtown Chicago attrac-
tions such as theaters and museums. Very friendly staff
and knowledgable, you cant go wrong staying here.”
2. “We loved the hotel. When I see other posts about
it being shabby I can’t for the life of me figure out
what they are talking about. Rooms were large with
TWO bathrooms, lobby was fabulous, pool was large
with two hot tubs and huge gym, staff was courteous.
For us, the location was great–across the street from
Grant Park with a great view of Buckingham Fountain
and close to all the museums and theatres. I’m sure
others would rather be north of the river closer to the
Magnificent Mile but we enjoyed the quieter and more
scenic location. Got it for $105 on Hotwire. What a
bargain for such a nice hotel.”
Answer: See footnote.3
The difficulty of detecting which of these reviews is fake
is consistent with recent large meta-analyses demonstrating
the inaccuracy of human judgments of deception, with accu-
racy rates typically near chance [1]. In particular, humans
have a difficult time identifying deceptive messages from
cues alone, and as such, it is not surprising that research on
estimating the prevalence of deception (see Section 8.2) has
generally relied on self-report methods, even though such
reports are difficult and expensive to obtain, especially in
large-scale settings, e.g., the web [5]. More importantly, self-
report methods, such as diaries and large-scale surveys, have
several methodological concerns, including social desirability
bias and self-deception [4]. Furthermore, there are consid-
erable disincentives to revealing one’s own deception in the
case of online reviews, such as being permanently banned
from a review portal, or harming a business’s reputation.
Recently, automated approaches (see Section 4.1) have
emerged to reliably label reviews as truthful vs. deceptive:
Ott et al. [15] train an n-gram–based text classifier using a
corpus of truthful and deceptive reviews—the former culled
from online review communities and the latter generated
using Amazon Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com).
Their resulting classifier is nearly 90% accurate.
In this work, we present a general framework (see Sec-
tion 2) for estimating the prevalence of deception in online
review communities. Given a classifier that distinguishes
truthful from deceptive reviews (like that described above),
and inspired by studies of disease prevalence [9, 10], we pro-
pose a generative model of deception (see Section 3) that
jointly models the classifier’s uncertainty as well as the ground-
truth deceptiveness of each review. Inference for this model,
3The first review is deceptive opinion spam.
which we perform via Gibbs sampling, allows us to estimate
the prevalence of deception in the underlying review commu-
nity, without relying on either self-reports or gold-standard
annotations.
We further propose a theoretical component to the frame-
work based on signaling theory from economics [18] (see Sec-
tion 6) and use it to reason about the factors that influence
deception prevalence in online review communities. In our
context, signaling theory interprets each review as a signal
to the product’s true, unknown quality; thus, the goal of
consumer reviews is to diminish the inherent information
asymmetry between consumers and producer. Very briefly,
according to a signaling theory approach, deception preva-
lence should be a function of the costs and benefits that
accrue from producing a fake review. We hypothesize that
review communities with low signaling cost, such as commu-
nities that make it easy to post a review, and large benefits,
such as highly trafficked sites, will exhibit more deceptive
opinion spam than those with higher signaling costs, such
as communities that establish additional requirements for
posting reviews, and lower benefits, such as low site traffic.
We apply our approach to the domain of hotel reviews.
In particular, we examine hotels from the Chicago area, re-
stricting attention to positive reviews only, and instantiate
the framework for six online review communities (see Sec-
tion 5): Expedia (http://www.expedia.com), Hotels.com
(http://www.hotels.com), Orbitz (http://www.orbitz.com),
Priceline (http://www.priceline.com), TripAdvisor (http:
//www.tripadvisor.com), and Yelp (http://www.yelp.com).
We find first that the prevalence of deception indeed varies
by community. However, because it is not possible to vali-
date these estimates empirically (i.e., the gold-standard rate
of deception in each community is unknown), we focus our
discussion instead on the relative differences in the rate of
deception between communities. Here, the results confirm
our hypotheses and suggest that deception is most prevalent
in communities with a low signal cost. Importantly, when
measures are taken to increase a community’s signal cost,
we find dramatic reductions in our estimates of the rate of
deception in that community.
2. FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose a framework to estimate the
prevalence, or rate, of deception among reviews in six on-
line review communities. Since reviews in these communi-
ties do not have gold-standard annotations of deceptiveness,
and neither human judgements nor self-reports of deception
are reliable in this setting (see discussion in Section 1), our
framework instead estimates the rates of deception in these
communities using the output of an imperfect, automated
deception classifier. In particular, we utilize a supervised
machine learning classifier, which has been shown recently
by Ott et al. [15] to be nearly 90% accurate at detecting
deceptive opinion spam in a class-balanced dataset.
A similar framework has been used previously in stud-
ies of disease prevalence, in which gold-standard diagnostic
testing is either too expensive, or impossible to perform [9,
10]. In such cases, it is therefore necessary to estimate the
prevalence of disease in the population using a combination
of an imperfect diagnostic test, and estimates of the test’s
positive and negative recall rates.4
4Recall rates of an imperfect diagnostic test are unlikely to
Our proposed framework is summarized here, with each
step discussed in greater detail in the corresponding section:
1. Data (Section 5):
Assume given a set of labeled training reviews, Dtrain =
{(xi, yi)}Ntraini=1 , where, for each review i, yi ∈ {0, 1}
gives the review’s label (0 for truthful, 1 for deceptive),
and xi ∈ R|V | gives the review’s feature vector repre-
sentation, for some feature space of size |V |. Similarly,
assume given a set of labeled truthful development re-
views, Ddev = {(xi, 0)}Ndevi=1 , and a set of unlabeled test
reviews, Dtest = {xi}Ntesti=1 .
2. Deception Classifier (Section 4.1):
Using the labeled training reviews, Dtrain, learn a su-
pervised deception classifier, f : R|V | → {0, 1}.
3. Classifier Sensitivity and Specificity (Section 4.2):
By cross-validation on Dtrain, estimate the sensitivity
(deceptive recall) of the deception classifier, f , as:
η = Pr(f(xi) = 1 | yi = 1). (1)
Then, use Ddev to estimate the specificity (truthful
recall) of the deception classifier, f , as:
θ = Pr(f(xi) = 0 | yi = 0). (2)
4. Prevalence Models (Section 3):
Finally, use f , η, θ, and either the Na¨ıve Prevalence
Model (Section 3.1), or the generative Bayesian Preva-
lence Model (Section 3.2), to estimate the prevalence
of deception, denoted pi, among reviews in Dtest. Note
that if we had gold-standard labels, {yi}Ntesti=1 , the gold-
standard prevalence of deception would be:
pi∗ =
1
N test
Ntest∑
i=1
yi. (3)
3. PREVALENCE MODELS
In Section 2, we propose a framework to estimate the
prevalence of deception in a group of reviews using only
the output of a noisy deception classifier. Central to this
framework is the Prevalence Model, which models the un-
certainty of the deception classifier, and ultimately produces
the desired prevalence estimate. In this section, we propose
two competing Prevalence Models, which can be used inter-
changeably in our framework.
3.1 Naïve Prevalence Model
The Na¨ıve Prevalence Model (na¨ıve) estimates the preva-
lence of deception in a corpus of reviews by correcting the
output of a noisy deception classifier according to the clas-
sifier’s known performance characteristics.
Formally, for a given deception classifier, f , let pif be the
number of reviews in Dtest for which f makes a positive
prediction, i.e., the number of reviews for which f predicts
deceptive. Also, let the sensitivity (deceptive recall) and
be known precisely. However, imprecise estimates can often
be obtained, especially in cases where it is feasible to perform
gold-standard testing on a small subpopulation.
 
 
Ntest 
α
π *
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f (xi )η* θ *
β γ
Figure 1: The Bayesian Prevalence Model in plate
notation. Shaded nodes represent observed vari-
ables, and arrows denote dependence. For example,
f(xi) is observed, and depends on η
∗, θ∗, and yi.
specificity (truthful recall) of f be given by η and θ, respec-
tively. Then, we can write the expectation of pif as:
E[pif ] = E
 1
N test
∑
x∈Dtest
δ[f(x) = 1]

=
1
N test
∑
x∈Dtest
E [δ [f(x) = 1]]
= ηpi∗ + (1− θ)(1− pi∗), (4)
where pi∗ is the true (latent) rate of deception, and δ[a = b]
is the Kronecker delta function, which is equal to 1 when
a = b, and 0 otherwise.
If we rearrange Equation 4 in terms of pi∗, and replace the
expectation of pif with the observed value, we get the Na¨ıve
Prevalence Model estimator:
pina¨ıve =
pif − (1− θ)
η − (1− θ) . (5)
Intuitively, Equation 5 corrects the raw classifier output,
given by pif , by subtracting from it the false positive rate,
given by 1 − θ, and dividing the result by the difference
between the true and false positive rates, given by η−(1−θ).
Notice that when f is an oracle,5 i.e., when η = θ = 1, the
Na¨ıve Prevalence Model estimate correctly reduces to the
oracle rate given by f , i.e., pina¨ıve = pif = pi
∗.
3.2 Bayesian Prevalence Model
Unfortunately, the Na¨ıve Prevalence Model estimate, pina¨ıve,
is not restricted to the range [0, 1]. Specifically, it is negative
when pif < 1− θ, and greater than 1 when pif > η. Further-
more, the Na¨ıve Prevalence Model makes the unrealistic as-
sumption that the estimates of the classifier’s sensitivity (η)
and specificity (θ), obtained using the procedure discussed
in Section 4.2 and Appendix B, are exact.
5An oracle is a classifier that does not make mistakes, and
always predicts the true, gold-standard label.
The Bayesian Prevalence Model (bayes) addresses these
limitations by modeling the generative process through which
deception occurs, or, equivalently, the joint probability dis-
tribution of the observed and latent data. In particular,
bayes models the observed classifier output, the true (la-
tent) rate of deception (pi∗), as well as the classifier’s true
(latent) sensitivity (η∗) and specificity (θ∗). Formally, bayes
assumes that our data was generated according to the fol-
lowing generative story:
• Sample the true rate of deception: pi∗ ∼ Beta(α)
• Sample the classifier’s true sensitivity: η∗ ∼ Beta(β)
• Sample the classifier’s true specificity: θ∗ ∼ Beta(γ)
• For each review i:
– Sample the ground-truth deception label:
yi ∼ Bernoulli(pi∗)
– Sample the classifier’s output:
f(xi) ∼
{
Bernoulli(η∗) if yi = 1
Bernoulli(1− θ∗) if yi = 0
The corresponding graphical model is given in plate nota-
tion in Figure 1. Notice that by placing Beta prior distribu-
tions on pi∗, η∗, and θ∗, bayes enables us to encode our prior
knowledge about the true rate of deception, as well as our
uncertainty about the estimates of the classifier’s sensitivity
and specificity. This is discussed further in Section 4.2.
A similar model has been proposed by Joseph et al. [10]
for studies of disease prevalence, in which it is necessary to
estimate the prevalence of disease in a population given only
an imperfect diagnostic test. However, that model samples
the total number of true positives and false negatives, while
our model samples the yi individually. Accordingly, while
pilot experiments confirm that the two models produce iden-
tical results, the generative story of our model, given above,
is comparatively much more intuitive.
3.2.1 Inference
While exact inference is intractable for the Bayesian Preva-
lence Model, a popular alternative way of approximating the
desired posterior distribution is with Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) sampling, and more specifically Gibbs sam-
pling. Gibbs sampling works by sampling each variable, in
turn, from the conditional distribution of that variable given
all other variables in the model. After repeating this proce-
dure for a fixed number of iterations, the desired posterior
distribution can be approximated from samples in the chain
by: (1) discarding a number of initial burn-in iterations, and
(2) since adjacent samples in the chain are often highly cor-
related, thinning the number of remaining samples according
to a sampling lag.
The conditional distributions of each variable given the
others can be derived from the joint distribution, which can
be read directly from the graph. Based on the graphical
representation of bayes, given in Figure 1, the joint distri-
bution of the observed and latent variables is just:
Pr(f(x),y, pi∗, η∗, θ∗;α,β,γ) = Pr(f(x) |y, η∗, θ∗)·
Pr(y |pi∗) · Pr(pi∗ |α) · Pr(η∗ |β) · Pr(θ∗ |γ), (6)
Table 1: Reference 5-fold cross-validated perfor-
mance of an SVM deception detection classifier in
a balanced dataset of TripAdvisor reviews, given by
Ott et al. [15]. F-score corresponds to the harmonic
mean of precision and recall.
metric performance
Accuracy 89.6%
Deceptive Precision 89.1%
Deceptive Recall 90.3%
Deceptive F-score 89.7%
Truthful Precision 90.1%
Truthful Recall 89.0%
Truthful F-score 89.6%
Baseline Accuracy 50%
where each term is given according to the sampling distri-
butions specified in the generative story in Section 3.2.
A common technique to simplify the joint distribution,
and the sampling process, is to integrate out (collapse) vari-
ables that do not need to be sampled. If we integrate out pi∗,
η∗, and θ∗ from Equation 6, we can derive a Gibbs sampler
that only needs to sample the yi’s at each iteration. The re-
sulting sampling equations, and the corresponding Bayesian
Prevalence Model estimate of the prevalence of deception,
pibayes, are given in greater detail in Appendix A.
4. DECEPTION DETECTION
4.1 Deception Classifier
The next component of the framework given in Section 2
is the deception classifier, which predicts whether each unla-
beled review is truthful (real) or deceptive (fake). Following
previous work [15], we assume given some amount of labeled
training reviews, so that we can train deception classifiers
using a supervised learning algorithm.
Previous work has shown that Support Vector Machines
(SVM) trained on n-gram features perform well in decep-
tion detection tasks [8, 13, 15]. Following Ott et al. [15],
we train linear SVM classifiers using the LIBSVM [2] soft-
ware package, and represent reviews using unigram and bi-
gram bag-of-words features. While more sophisticated and
purpose-built classifiers might achieve better performance,
pilot experiments suggest that the Prevalence Models (see
Section 3) are not heavily affected by minor differences in
classifier performance. Furthermore, the simple approach
just outlined has been previously evaluated to be nearly 90%
accurate at detecting deception in a balanced dataset [15].
Reference cross-validated classifier performance appears in
Table 1.
4.2 Classifier Sensitivity and Specificity
Both Prevalence Models introduced in Section 3 can uti-
lize knowledge of the underlying deception classifier’s sensi-
tivity (η∗), i.e., deceptive recall rate, and specificity (θ∗), i.e.,
truthful recall rate. While it is not possible to obtain gold-
standard values for these parameters, we can obtain rough
estimates of their values (denoted η and θ, respectively)
through a combination of cross-validation, and evaluation
on a labeled development set. For the Na¨ıve Prevalence
Table 2: Corpus statistics for unlabeled test reviews
from six online review communities.
community # hotels # reviews
Expedia 100 4,341
Hotels.com 103 6,792
Orbitz 97 1,777
Priceline 98 4,027
TripAdvisor 104 9,602
Yelp 103 1,537
Mechanical Turk 20 400
Model, the estimates are used directly, and are assumed to
be exact.
For the Bayesian Prevalence Model, we adopt an empiri-
cal Bayesian approach and use the estimates to inform the
corresponding Beta priors via their hyperparameters, β and
γ, respectively. The full procedure is given in Appendix B.
5. DATA
In this section, we briefly discuss each of the three kinds of
data used by our framework introduced in Section 2. Corpus
statistics are given in Table 2. Following Ott et al. [15], we
excluded all reviews with fewer than 150 characters, as well
as all non-English reviews.6
5.1 Training Reviews (Dtrain)
Training a supervised deception classifier requires labeled
training data. Following Ott et al. [15], we build a balanced
set of 800 training reviews, containing 400 truthful reviews
from six online review communities, and 400 gold-standard
deceptive reviews from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Deceptive Reviews: In Section 1, we discuss some of the
difficulties associated with obtaining gold-standard labels of
deception, including the inaccuracy of human judgements,
and the problems with self-reports of deception. To avoid
these difficulties, Ott et al. [15] have recently created 400
gold-standard deceptive reviews using Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk service. In particular, they paid one US dol-
lar ($1) to each of 400 unique Mechanical Turk workers
to write a fake positive (5-star) review for one of the 20
most heavily-reviewed Chicago hotels on TripAdvisor. Each
worker was given a link to the hotel’s website, and instructed
to write a convincing review from the perspective of a satis-
fied customer. Any submission found to be plagiarized was
rejected. Any submission with fewer than 150 characters
was discarded. To date, this is the only publicly-available7
gold-standard deceptive opinion spam dataset. As such, we
choose it to be our sole source of labeled deceptive reviews
for training our supervised deception classifiers. Note that
these same reviews are used to estimate the resulting clas-
sifier sensitivity (deceptive recall), via the cross-validation
procedure given in Appendix B.
Truthful Reviews: Many of the same challenges that make
it difficult to obtain gold-standard deceptive reviews, also
apply to obtaining truthful reviews. Related work [8, 11]
has hypothesized that the relative impact of spam reviews
6Language was identified by the Language Detection Li-
brary: http://code.google.com/p/language-detection/.
7http://www.cs.cornell.edu/~myleott/op_spam
Table 3: Signal costs associated with six online re-
view communities, sorted approximately from high-
est signal cost to lowest. Posting cost is High if users
are required to purchase a product before review-
ing it, and Low otherwise. Exposure benefit is Low,
Medium, or High based on the number of reviews in
the community (see Table 2).
community posting cost exposure benefit
Orbitz High Low
Priceline High Medium
Expedia High Medium
Hotels.com High Medium
Yelp Low Low
TripAdvisor Low High
is smaller for heavily-reviewed products, and that therefore
spam should be less common among them. For consistency
with our labeled deceptive review data, we simply label as
truthful all positive (5-star) reviews of the 20 previously
chosen Chicago hotels. We then draw a random sample of
size 400, and take that to be our labeled truthful training
data.
5.2 Development Reviews (Ddev)
By training on deceptive and truthful reviews from the
same 20 hotels, we are effectively controlling our classifier
for topic. However, because this training data is not repre-
sentative of Chicago hotel reviews in general, it is important
that we do not use it to estimate the resulting classifier’s
specificity (truthful recall). Accordingly, as specified in our
framework (Section 2), classifier specificity is instead esti-
mated on a separate, labeled truthful development set, which
we draw uniformly at random from the unlabeled reviews in
each review community. For consistency with the sensitivity
estimate, the size of the draw is always 400 reviews.
5.3 Test Reviews (Dtest)
The last data component of our framework is the set of
test reviews, among which to estimate the prevalence of de-
ception. To avoid evaluating reviews that are too different
from our training data in either sentiment (due to negative
reviews), or topic (due to reviews of hotels outside Chicago),
we constrain each community’s test set to contain only pos-
itive (5-star) Chicago hotel reviews. This unfortunately dis-
qualifies our estimates of each community’s prevalence of
deception from being representative of all hotel reviews. No-
tably, estimates of the prevalence of deception among nega-
tive reviews might be very different from our estimates, due
to the distinct motives of posting deceptive positive vs. neg-
ative reviews. We discuss this further in Section 9.
6. SIGNAL THEORY
In terms of economic theory, the role of review commu-
nities is to reduce the inherent information asymmetry [18]
between buyers and sellers in online marketplaces, by provid-
ing buyers with a priori knowledge of the underlying quality
of the products being sold [7]. It follows that if reviews regu-
larly failed to reduce this information asymmetry, or, worse,
convey false information, then they would cease to be of
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Figure 2: Graph of Na¨ıve estimates of deception prevalence versus time, for six online review communities.
Blue (a–d) and red (e–f) graphs correspond to high and low posting cost communities, respectively.
value to the user. Given that review communities are, in
fact, valued by users [3], it seems unlikely that the preva-
lence of deception among them is large.
Nonetheless, there is widespread concern about the preva-
lence of deception in online reviews, rightly or wrongly, and
further, deceptive reviews can be cause for concern even in
small quantities, e.g., if they are concentrated in a single
review community. We propose that by framing reviews as
signals—voluntary communications that serve to convey in-
formation about the signaler [18], we can reason about the
factors underlying deception by manipulating the distinct
signal costs associated with truthful vs. deceptive reviews.
Specifically, we claim that for a positive review to be
posted in a given review community, there must be an in-
curred signal cost, that is increased by:
1. The posting cost for posting the review in a given
review community, i.e., whether users are required to
purchase a product prior to reviewing it (high cost) or
not (low cost). Some sites, for example, allow anyone
to post reviews about any hotel, making the review
cost effectively zero. Other sites, however, require the
purchase of the hotel room before a review can be writ-
ten, raising the cost from zero to the price of the room.
and decreased by:
2. The exposure benefit of posting the review in that
review community, i.e., the benefit derived from other
users reading the review, which is proportional to the
size of the review community’s audience. Review sites
with more traffic have greater exposure benefit.
Observe that both the posting cost and the exposure benefit
depend entirely on the review community. An overview of
these factors for each of the six review communities is given
in Table 3.
Based on the signal cost function just defined, we propose
two hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1 : Review communities that have low sig-
nal costs (low posting requirements, high exposure),
e.g., TripAdvisor and Yelp, will have more deception
than communities with high signal costs, e.g., Orbitz.
• Hypothesis 2 : Increasing the signal cost will decrease
the prevalence of deception.
7. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The framework described in Section 2 is instantiated for
the six review communities introduced in Section 5. In par-
ticular, we first train our SVM deception classifier following
the procedure outlined in Section 4.1. An important step
when training SVM classifiers is setting the cost parameter,
C. We set C using a nested 5-fold cross-validation pro-
cedure, and choose the value that gives the best average
balanced accuracy, defined as 1
2
(sensitivity + specificity).
We then estimate the classifier’s sensitivity, specificity,
and hyperparameters, using the procedure outlined in Sec-
tion 4.2 and Appendix B. Based on those estimates, we then
estimate the prevalence of deception among reviews in our
test set using the Na¨ıve and the Bayesian Prevalence Models.
Gibbs sampling for the Bayesian Prevalence Model is per-
formed using Equations 7 and 8 (given in Appendix A) for
70,000 iterations, with a burn-in of 20,000 iterations, and
a sampling lag of 50. We use an uninformative (uniform)
prior for pi∗, i.e., α = 〈1, 1〉. Multiple runs are performed to
verify the stability of the results.
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Figure 3: Graph of Bayesian estimates of deception prevalence versus time, for six online review communities.
Blue (a–d) and red (e–f) graphs correspond to high and low posting cost communities, respectively. Error
bars show Bayesian 95% credible intervals.
8. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Estimates of the prevalence of deception for six review
communities over time, given by the Na¨ıve Prevalence Model,
appear in Figure 2. Blue graphs (a–d) correspond to com-
munities with High posting cost (see Table 3), i.e., commu-
nities for which you are required to book a hotel room before
posting a review, while red graphs (e–f) correspond to com-
munities with Low posting cost, i.e., communities that allow
any user to post reviews for any hotel.
In agreement with Hypothesis 1 (given in Section 6), it
is clear from Figure 2 that deceptive opinion spam is de-
creasing or stationary over time for High posting cost re-
view communities (blue graphs, a–d). In contrast, review
communities that allow any user to post reviews for any ho-
tel, i.e., Low posting cost communities (red graphs, e–f), are
seeing growth in their rate of deceptive opinion spam.
Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 3.1, we observe that
the prevalence estimates produced by the Na¨ıve Prevalence
Model are often negative. This occurs when the rate at
which the classifier makes positive predictions is below the
classifier’s estimated false positive rate, suggesting both that
the estimated false positive rate of the classifier is perhaps
overestimated, and that the classifier’s estimated specificity
(truthful recall rate, given by θ) is perhaps underestimated.
We address this further in Section 8.1.
The Bayesian Prevalence Model, on the other hand, en-
codes the uncertainty in the estimated values of the classi-
fier’s sensitivity and specificity through two Beta priors, and
in particular their hyperparameters, β and γ. Estimates of
the prevalence of deception for the six review communities
over time, given by the Bayesian Prevalence Model, appear
in Figure 3. Blue (a–d) and red (e–f) graphs, as before, cor-
respond to communities with High and Low posting costs,
respectively.
In agreement with Hypothesis 1 (Section 6), we again find
that Low signal cost communities, e.g., TripAdvisor, seem to
contain larger quantities and accelerated growth of deceptive
opinion spam when compared to High signal cost communi-
ties, e.g., Orbitz. Interestingly, communities with a blend of
signal costs appear to have medium rates of deception that
are neither growing nor declining, e.g., Hotels.com, which
has a rate of deception of ≈ 2%.
To test Hypothesis 2, i.e., that increasing the signal cost
will decrease the prevalence of deception, we need to increase
the signal cost, as we have defined it in Section 6. Thus, it
is necessary to either increase the posting cost, or decrease
the exposure benefit. And while we have no control over a
community’s exposure benefit, we can increase the posting
cost by, for example, hiding all reviews written by users
who have not posted at least two reviews. Essentially, by
requiring users to post more than one review in order for
their review to be displayed, we are increasing the posting
cost and, accordingly, the signal cost as well.
Bayesian Prevalence Model estimates for TripAdvisor for
varying signal costs appear in Figure 4. In particular, we
give the estimated prevalence of deception over time af-
ter removing reviews written by first-time review writers,
and after removing reviews written by first- or second-time
review writers. In agreement with Hypothesis 2, we see a
clear reduction in the prevalence of deception over time on
TripAdvisor after removing these reviews, with rates drop-
ping from ≈ 6%, to ≈ 5%, and finally to ≈ 4%, suggesting
that an increased signal cost may indeed help to reduce the
prevalence of deception in online review communities.
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(a) TripAdvisor. All reviews.
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(b) TripAdvisor. First-time reviewers ex-
cluded.
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(c) TripAdvisor. First-time and second-
time reviewers excluded.
Figure 4: Graph of Bayesian estimates of deception prevalence versus time, for TripAdvisor, with reviews
written by new users excluded. Excluding reviews written by first- or second-time reviewers increases the
signal cost, and decreases the prevalence of deception.
8.1 Assumptions and Limitations
In this work we have made a number of assumptions, a
few of which we will now highlight and discuss.
First, we note that our unlabeled test set, Dtest, overlaps
with our labeled truthful training set, Dtrain. Consequently,
we will underestimate the prevalence of deception, because
the overlapping reviews will be more likely to be classified
at test time as truthful, having been seen in training as be-
ing truthful. Excluding these overlapping reviews from the
test set results in overestimating the prevalence of decep-
tion, based on the hypothesis that the overlapping reviews,
chosen from the 20 most highly-reviewed Chicago hotels, are
more likely to be truthful to begin with.
Second, we observe that our development set, Ddev, con-
taining labeled truthful reviews, is not gold-standard. Un-
fortunately, while it is necessary to obtain a uniform sample
of reviews in order to fairly estimate the classifier’s truthful
recall rate (specificity), such review samples are inherently
unlabeled. This can be problematic if the underlying rate of
deception is high among the reviews from which the devel-
opment set is sampled, because the specificity will then be
underestimated. Indeed, our Na¨ıve Prevalence Model regu-
larly produces negative estimates, suggesting that the esti-
mated classifier specificity may indeed be underestimated,
possibly due to deceptive reviews in the development set.
Third, our proposal for increasing the signal cost, by hid-
ing reviews written by first- or second-time reviewers, is not
ideal. While our results confirm that hiding these reviews
will cause an immediate reduction in deception prevalence,
the increase in signal cost might be insufficient to discourage
new deception, once deceivers become aware of the increased
posting requirements.
Fourth, in this work we have only considered a limited
version of the deception prevalence problem. In particular,
we have only considered positive Chicago hotel reviews, and
our classifier is trained on deceptive reviews coming only
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Both negative reviews as
well as deceptive reviews obtained by other means are likely
to be different in character than the data used in this study.
8.2 Implications for Psychological Research
The current research also represents a novel approach to a
long-standing and ongoing debate around deception preva-
lence in the psychological literature. In one of the first large-
scale studies looking at how often people lie in everyday
communication, DePaulo et al. [4] used a diary method to
calculate the average number of lies told per day. At the
end of seven days participants told approximately one to
two lies per day, with more recent studies replicating this
general finding [6], suggesting that deception is frequent in
human communication. More recently, Serota et al. [17]
conducted a large scale representative survey of Americans
asking participants how often they lied in the last 24 hours.
While they found the same average deception rate as pre-
vious research (approximately 1.65 lies per day), they dis-
covered that the data was heavily skewed, with 60 percent
of the participants reporting no lies at all. They concluded
that rather than deception prevalence being spread evenly
across the population, there are instead a few prolific liars.
Unfortunately, both sides of this debate have relied solely
on self-report data.
The current approach offers a novel method for assessing
deception prevalence that does not require self-report, but
can provide insight into the prevalence of deception in hu-
man communication more generally. At the same time, the
question raised by the psychological research also mirrors
an important point regarding the prevalence of deception in
online reviews: are a few deceptive reviews posted by many
people, or are there many deceptive reviews told by only a
few? That is, do some hotels have many fake reviews while
others are primarily honest? Or, is there a little bit of cheat-
ing by most hotels? This kind of individualized modeling
represents an important next step in this line of research.
9. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented a general framework for
estimating the prevalence of deception in online review com-
munities, based on the output of a noisy deception classifier.
Using this framework, we have explored the prevalence of
deception among positive reviews in six popular online re-
view communities, and provided the first empirical study of
the magnitude, and influencing factors of deceptive opinion
spam.
We have additionally proposed a theoretical model of on-
line reviews as a signal to a product’s true (unknown) qual-
ity, based on economic signaling theory. Specifically, we have
defined the signal cost of positive online reviews as a func-
tion of the posting costs and exposure benefits of the review
community in which it is posted. Based on this theory, we
have further suggested two hypotheses, both of which are
supported by our findings. In particular, we find first that
review communities with low signal costs (low posting re-
quirements, high exposure) have more deception than com-
munities with comparatively higher signal costs. Second, we
find that by increasing the signal cost of a review community,
e.g., by excluding reviews written by first- or second-time re-
viewers, we can effectively reduce both the prevalence and
the growth rate of deception in that community.
Future work might explore other methods for manipu-
lating the signal costs associated with posting online re-
views, and the corresponding effects on deception preva-
lence. For example, some sites, such as Angie’s List (http:
//www.angieslist.com/), charge a monthly access fee in or-
der to browse or post reviews, and future work might study
the effectiveness of such techniques at deterring deception.
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APPENDIX
A. GIBBS SAMPLER FOR BAYESIAN PREVA-
LENCE MODEL
Gibbs sampling of the Bayesian Prevalence Model, intro-
duced in Section 3.2, is performed according to the following
conditional distributions:
Pr(yi = 1 | f(x),y(−i);α,β,γ)
∝ (α1 +N (−i)1 ) ·
βf(xi) +X
(−i)
f(xi)∑
β +N
(−i)
1
, (7)
and,
Pr(yi = 0 | f(x),y(−i);α,β,γ)
∝ (α0 +N (−i)0 ) ·
γ1−f(xi) + Y
(−i)
f(xi)∑
γ +N
(−i)
0
, (8)
where,
X
(−i)
k =
∑
j 6=i
σ[yj = 1] · σ[f(xj) = k],
Y
(−i)
k =
∑
j 6=i
σ[yj = 0] · σ[f(xj) = k],
N
(−i)
1 = X
(−i)
0 +X
(−i)
1 ,
N
(−i)
0 = Y
(−i)
0 + Y
(−i)
1 .
After sampling, we reconstruct the collapsed variables to
yield the Bayesian Prevalence Model estimate of the preva-
lence of deception:
pibayes =
α1 +N1∑
α+N test
. (9)
Estimates of the classifier’s sensitivity and specificity are
similarly given by:
ηbayes =
β1 +X1∑
β +N1
, (10)
θbayes =
γ1 + Y0∑
γ +N0
. (11)
B. ESTIMATING CLASSIFIER SENSITIV-
ITY AND SPECIFICITY
We estimate the sensitivity and specificity of our deception
classifier via the following procedure:
1. Assume given a labeled training set, Dtrain, containing
N train reviews of n hotels. Also assume given a devel-
opment set, Ddev, containing labeled truthful reviews.
2. Split Dtrain into n folds, Dtrain1 , . . . ,Dtrainn , of sizes given
by, N train1 , . . . , N
train
n , respectively, such thatDtrainj con-
tains all (and only) reviews of hotel j. Let Dtrain(−j) con-
tain all reviews except those of hotel j.
3. Then, for each hotel j:
(a) Train a classifier, fj , from reviews in Dtrain(−j) , and
use it to classify reviews in Dtrainj .
(b) Let |TP |j correspond to the observed number of
true positives, i.e.:
|TP |j =
∑
(x,y)∈Dtrainj
σ[y = 1] · σ[fj(x) = 1]. (12)
(c) Similarly, let |FN |j correspond to the observed
number of false negatives.
4. Calculate the aggregate number of true positives (|TP |)
and false negatives (|FN |), and compute the sensitivity
(deceptive recall) as:
η =
|TP |
|TP |+ |FN | . (13)
5. Train a classifier using all reviews in Dtrain, and use it
to classify reviews in Ddev.
6. Let the resulting number of true negative and false
positive predictions in Ddev be given by |TN |dev and
|FP |dev, respectively, and compute the specificity (truth-
ful recall) as:
θ =
|TN |dev
|TN |dev + |FP |dev . (14)
For the Bayesian Prevalence Model, we observe that the
posterior distribution of a variable with an uninformative
(uniform) Beta prior, after observing a successes and b fail-
ures, is just Beta(a+1, b+1), i.e., a and b are pseudo counts.
Based on this observation, we set the hyperparameters β and
γ, corresponding to the classifier’s sensitivity (deceptive re-
call) and specificity (truthful recall), respectively, to:
β = 〈|FN |+ 1, |TP |+ 1〉 ,
γ = 〈|FP |dev + 1, |TN |dev + 1〉 .
